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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the causal relationship between fertility and female labor supply 
using census data from 14 Latin American countries and the U.S. over three decades 
(1980, 1990 and 2000). Parental preferences for a gender-balanced family is exploi-
ted as a source of exogenous variation. Although OLS estimates suggest a negative 
relationship, instrumental variables fails to identify a causal effect in most countries. 
When considering a pool of married women, a negative causal effect is found. In any 
case, despite having a highly accurate first-stage, the analysis of the quality of the 
instrument reveals a weak explanatory power of sibling sex composition on fertility.
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RESUMEN
Este artículo estudia la relación causal entre fertilidad y oferta de trabajo femenino 
usando datos censales de 14 países de Latinoamérica y EE.UU en un período de tres 
décadas (1980s, 1990s y 2000s). La preferencia de los padres por una estructura fami-
liar balanceada (en términos de género) se utiliza como fuente de variación exógena. 
Aunque las estimaciones de MCO sugieren una relación negativa, el método de va-
riables instrumentales no identifica un efecto para la mayor parte de los países. Con-
siderando las mujeres casadas se obtiene un efecto negativo. El análisis de la calidad 
del instrumento revela un débil poder explicativo del género sobre la fertilidad.
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I. Introduction 
The increase in the participation of women in the labor market has been 
one of the most dynamic labor milestones worldwide during the last cen-
tury. A lot of theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to account 
for the possible explanations for this increase (Killingsworth and Heck-
man, 1986; Chioda, 2011). Many of them focused their arguments on the 
determinants of the demand side, while others did so for the supply side. 
In particular, a stream of these studies focused on the relationship between 
the biological phenomenon of the conception of o spring (fertility) and the 
economic phenomenon of working women, finding a negative and robust 
correlation between these variables in all of them.
Using data from World Development Indicators (WDI) for several 
Latin American countries in the period 1980-2009, Figure Nr. 1 shows the 
evolution of the female labor participation rate (ratio of women working 
or seeking work in relation to the working age population) and the fertility 
rate (births per woman). On average, female labor participation has in-
creased monotonically (30%), while fertility has decreased monotonically 
Figure Nr. 1: Labor Force Participation and Fertility (Latin America)
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(44%) over the period. This stylized fact is present in each country, as can 
be seen in Figure Nr. 2.1
The main problem that arises from these simple negative correlations 
lies in the simultaneity between fertility and female labor supply, which 
prevents the interpretation of this relationship as a causal effect. Moreo-
ver, the observed negative correlations between fertility and labor supply 
could be spurious.
Figure Nr. 2: Labor Force Participation and Fertility (by countries)
Source: own estimates based on WDI-World Bank. Countries from left to right are: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Left axis: \Female labor participation (% of total labor force)”; Right axis: \
Fertility rate (births per woman)”.
1. Guinnane (2011) studies the historical transition of European countries and the United States from 
high fertility to low fertility between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before the transition, wom-
en conceived up to eight children on average and the elasticity of fertility with respect to income was 
positive. Currently, many women choose not to have children, and the elasticity of fertility with respect 
to income is zero or even negative.
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On the basis of these arguments, Angrist and Evans (1998) (henceforth 
AE) estimated a negative causal effect of fertility on female labor supply 
for the U.S. exploiting a source of exogenous variability in family size: 
the parental preferences for a mixed sibling sex composition (Williamson, 
1983). This stylized fact has been documented in numerous studies and 
indicates that parents of same-sex siblings are significantly more likely to 
have an additional child.2 Since the sex mix is virtually randomly assig-
ned, an indicator variable for whether the sex of the second child matches 
the sex of the first child provides a plausible instrument for further chil-
dbearing among women with at least two children, and in this way it is 
possible to measure the effect of moving from the second to the third child 
on labor supply.
Many other studies have tried to extend AE’s work to other countries 
using the same source of exogenous variation in fertility. Iacovou (2001) 
and Van der Stoep (2008) used the same-sex instrument as in AE for the 
United Kingdom and South Africa, respectively, and in both cases, the IV 
estimates were not statistically significant. Daouli, Demoussis and Gian-
nakopoulos (2009) did the same for Greece, finding a negative causal effect 
on the probability of working at the 10% level in 1991, which disappears 
in 2001. In Sweden, Hirvonen (2009) found a strong negative effect on 
women’s earnings and a mild effect on labor force participation. Cools 
(2012) obtained a similar result for Norway, although the effect on labor 
participation is not precise enough to be statistically different from zero. 
Cruces and Galiani (2007) found a negative causal effect for Argentina and 
Mexico. Finally, Chun and Oh (2002) for South Korea, and Agüero and 
Marks (2008) for a pool of 6 Latin American countries used variations of 
AE’s empirical strategy.3 In the first case, the authors found a strong ne-
gative causal effect on labor supply, and in the second case the estimates 
2. For instance, Ben-Porath and Welch (1976) found for the 1970 census of the United States that 56% 
of the families whose first two children were of the same sex had a third child, while 51% with a boy and 
a girl had a third child.
3. Chun and Oh (2002) exploit South Korean households’ preferences towards male children because of 
their superior labor market performance with respect to females. They instrument fertility with the sex 
of the first child under the assumption that if it is a female, their parents will try to conceive another 
one. In Agüero and Marks (2008) the exogenous source of variation in family size is based on infertility 
shocks as a random event.
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were imprecise. Taking all these studies into account, it follows that causal 
evidence between fertility and labor supply is far from being conclusive.
So far, the study of Cruces and Galiani (2007) (henceforth CG) is the 
only causal evidence that uses AE’s identification strategy for Latin Ame-
rican countries. The authors point out that, compared to the U.S. women 
in Latin America are characterized by having more children, lower educa-
tion levels and fewer formal facilities for childcare. Likewise, households 
in Latin America have faced structural changes in recent decades, which 
have affected women’s labor decisions and the allocation of their resources 
within the household. First, the rise in female labor participation meant a 
new source of household income. Second, investment in education grew 
steadily with important consequences not only for women’s earning po-
tential but also for their identity and aspirations. Third, there has been 
an extended effort in the region to reduce poverty through policies that 
directly or indirectly favored women’s access to income and economic as-
sets, such as microcredit programs and conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs (Chioda, 2011). For all these reasons, it is interesting to extend 
the analysis to a broader group of developing countries.
Lastly, analyzing the relationship between fertility and labor supply 
could be of political interest since both variables are associated with po-
verty and well-being. For example, if fertility actually had a negative effect 
on female labor supply, a system of subsidies for childcare could relax the 
temporal restriction of mothers, fostering their reinsertion into the labor 
market, and providing an extra income source for the family.
In this sense, the main purpose of the paper is to proceed in this re-
search line, trying to determine whether the negative causal effect of ferti-
lity on women’s labor participation found in the U.S., Argentina and Mexi-
co can be extended to other Latin American countries.4
Throughout the work, I use census data from 14 Latin American coun-
tries and the U.S. (as a benchmark for a developed country) for the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s, and the relationship between the variables of interest is 
4. As mentioned by Angrist (2004), the external validity of IV estimates is ultimately established less by 
new econometric methods than by replication in new data sets.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 32  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS).
Even though OLS estimates suggest a negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between fertility and mothers’ labor supply in each Latin 
American country, 2SLS estimates fail to identify a causal effect in most 
of them. Namely, the average effect of moving from a two-child family 
to a larger one is statistically zero for those women whose fertility deci-
sions are changed by the instrument (compliers). Considering a sample 
of married women for a pool of countries over the span of three decades, 
a negative and statistically significant causal effect is found. In any case, 
despite having very precise first-stage estimations (and evidence in favor 
of the exclusion restriction), an analysis of the quality of the instrument 
reveals a weak explanatory power of sibling sex composition on fertili-
ty. The problem of weak instruments entails a huge efficiency loss in the 
second-stage, with large standard errors that make the interpretation of IV 
estimates meaningless.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II sets out 
a simple model of female labor supply and introduces the empirical stra-
tegy. Section III provides a description of the data sets used for estimation 
as well as some summary statistics. Later, section IV discusses the internal 
validity of the strategy and section V presents and discusses the results of 
my analysis. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Conceptual and empirical framework
II.1. Theoretical Framework
The relationship between female labor supply and the number of children 
can be represented by an adapted version of the stylized static model of 
Browning (1992). The woman’s utility function can be defined as U = u(C, 
θ, h), where C denotes the consumption of the mother and children with 
price pC, θ is the time devoted to leisure, and h is the number of children 
with a cost per child given by ph. The function is assumed to be increasing 
in all its arguments. The woman divides her total time T between work at 
home lf = g(h) (housework and childcare), θ leisure and work in the market 
lm for which she receives a wage w. Besides, there is a fixed income I from 
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the household. The logic of the model is that, while children provide uti-
lity to their parents, they also enter the household budget constraint since 
they involve considerable costs, both in terms of goods (e.g., food, clothing 
and school materials) and time devoted to childcare. Each woman solves 
the following utility maximization problem:
  (1)
I + wlm = pCC + phh      (budget constraint)  (2)
T =  lf + lm + θ      (time constraint)   (3)
The two constraints can be summarized as I+wT=(wθ+pCC)+(phh+wlf ), 
which describes the allocation of the household’s full income between the 
woman and the child. An explicit utility function and the first and second 
order conditions of the optimization problem define the demand for chil-
dren and the women’s labor supply.
Even though this simple setting, as it stands, is too general to derive 
explicit solutions, it still captures the essence of the theoretical relationship 
between fertility and female labor supply: the utility function, the budget 
and time constraints imply a trade-off between “pure” utility from chil-
dren, labor income and the needs of children (time and goods).5 Besides, 
the model can be used to illustrate the underlying endogeneity that arises 
in the empirical estimation of labor supply models.
This work seeks to identify the direct effect of the children h on the 
labor supply of women, represented by l*m = T − θ* − l*f. Following Brow-
ning (1992), the model from equations (1)-(3) results in a conditional labor 
supply (either in terms of hour -intensive margin- or as a binary partici-
pation indicator -extensive margin-) defined as Y= f(K,D), where K is a 
vector that contains the variables in the model and some exogenous cha-
racteristics, and D is a measure of fertility (such as the number of children 
h, or an indicator of more than h children in a sample of women with h or 
5. Dynamic models often predict a negative causal effect of fertility on short-run labor supply through 
the time needs of children in the time constraint.
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more children). The parameter of interest is the labor supply response to 
changes in fertility, fD. However, this parameter is difficult to recover by 
simple statistical methods. For instance, ignoring the effects of fertility on 
all other variables included in K and considering the potential effects of 
fertility on wages, results in:
 
w D
Y w f f
D D
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
  (4)
Childbearing might have an effect on wages ( 0w D∂ ∂ ≠ ), for example 
because of the foregone appreciation in the woman’s “stock of experience” 
during maternity leave. Moreover, since wages are determined by ability 
and motivation or ambition, which are unobservable, they may be corre-
lated with fertility decisions through childbearing and leisure preferences 
in the utility function U. Taking into account all the variables of the model 
would add partial derivatives of the components of K with respect to D. 
This discussion suggests that a fertility indicator D would be endogenous 
in a labor supply model. An additional factor is that unobserved factors 
might be driving both decisions.
In this sense, Willis (1987) suggests that a solution to this endogeneity 
problem is to find a variable Z that induces variation in fertility but does 
not directly affect labor supply decisions, which allows the derivation of a 
reduced form relationship between fertility and labor supply. Continuing 
the example presented in equation (4), if Z is not related to the factors that 
account for w D∂ ∂ , then:
w D D
Y w D Y Df f f
Z ZZ Z Z
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + ⇒ =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
 (5)
since the exogeneity of Z with respect to w implies that 0w Z∂ ∂ = . In this 
way, the parameter of interest, i.e. the response of labor supply to changes 
in fertility, is identified.
II.2. Empirical Strategy
This subsection presents the empirical strategy adopted throughout the 
work to identify the direct effect of fertility on female labor supply. Based 
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on equation (4) of the theoretical framework, a first attempt at estimating 
the mentioned effect consists in comparing the average occupational sta-
tus of women, by running an OLS regression of Y on D. However, this 
simple comparison is unlikely to identify any meaningful causal effect due 
to the presence of selection bias.6
To solve this endogeneity problem I rely on sex mix as a natural experi-
ment. This strategy, first proposed by Angrist and Evans (1998), relies on the 
sex of women’s first two children as an instrument for fertility, and can be 
justified as follows. The sex composition of children affects fertility through 
parental sex preferences. That is, parents whose first two children have the 
same sex, exhibit a higher probability of having another child to attain their 
desired composition (Williamson, 1983). Since the gender of children is ran-
dom and making the identifying assumption that it affects labor supply only 
through its effect on fertility, the Same-sex indicator can be used as an instru-
ment for fertility and thus a causal effect can be identified for the subpopula-
tion of compliers.7 Bearing this in mind, I estimate the following equation:
  (6)
where Y is a measure of labor supply, D is the endogenous fertility mea-
sure, X includes plausibly exogenous characteristics like the age of the 
woman and her age at first birth, and s1 and s2 are indicators for the sex of 
the first two children.8 This model is estimated by 2SLS with a first-stage 
regression of the form:
D
i
= ′δ X
i
+δ
1
s
1i
+δ
2
s
2i
+ γZ
i
+ v
i
  (7)
6.  For instance, childbearing decisions take into account expected potential outcomes, career plans, com-
parative advantages, preferences and the division of labor within the household. Then, it could happen 
that women lacking opportunities for childcare arrangements, with stronger preferences for children, or 
who forecast relatively poor labor market outcomes (such as a low quality job, or low wages) self-select 
into treatment (have children) and decide to work at home. On the other hand, women who expect good 
labor market outcomes probably self-select into lower fertility (non treatment).
7. Compliers are women who would have had an additional child if their first two children were of the 
same sex, but would not have had it if the first two were of different sex.
8. AE argue that Same-sex can be written as a function of s1 and s2, and therefore it is potentially correlated 
with the sex of either child. Accordingly it is important to control for any secular additive effect of child sex.
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Since the 2SLS framework allows for more than one instrument, the 
estimations are also carried out by decomposing the Same-sex indicator into 
Two-boys= s1s2 and Two-girls= (1-s1)(1-s2).9 In this case, the first-stage model is:
D
i
= ′δ X
i
+δ
1
s
1i
+ γ
0
z
1i
+ γ
1
Z
2i
+ v
i   (8)
The parameters in the first-stage are g, g0 and g1. The parameter of inter-
est in the second-stage is b: the average effect of Di on Yi for those women 
whose fertility status is changed by the instrument.
III. Data and summary statistics
The microdata employed in the present study come from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series International (IPUMS-International), a project 
dedicated to collecting, harmonizing and distributing census data from 
around the world. I analyze the data from 14 Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and the 
U.S. for the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.10 In order to carry out the estimations, 
further adjustments were necessary. Women with at least two children 
were selected from the total sample, and their characteristics were linked 
to those of their children. As in AE and CG, the samples were limited to 
women aged between 21 and 35 years, whose eldest child was not older 
than 18 years and whose second child was at least 1 year old at the time of 
the census.11
Regarding the variables used in the study, the outcome of interest for 
the estimations (Worked for pay) is an indicator equal to 1 if the woman 
worked in the reference week (typically the week prior to the census) and 
is not a family worker without remuneration and 0 otherwise. The reason 
9. When using these two instruments, it is not possible to control for the sex of the first two children 
because of perfect multicollinearity. As in AE and CG, the results control for the sex of the first child.
10. The data correspond to 10% nationally representative samples with the exception of Brazil and the 
U.S. where the samples are approximately 5%. A list of countries and years used are reported in Table 
A1 of the online appendix at http://economics:dtortarolo:com:ar/.
11. Since I use the same data source and make the same adjustments as in AE and CG, the results can 
be compared with that of them. More details about the adjustments of the data can be found in the online 
appendix.
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for using this variable is that it is available for all countries and periods 
considered, and it is the same variable used by AE and CG. The fertility 
variable (More than 2 children) is an indicator defined as 1 for women with 
three or more children, and 0 otherwise. This endogenous indicator is ins-
trumented by Same-sex, Two-boys and Two-girls which are equal to 1 if the 
first two children were the same sex, two males or two females respecti-
vely, and 0 otherwise in all cases.
Before restricting the sample to women with two or more children, it is 
important to analyze the evolution of fertility and the female labor partici-
pation rate using the raw data from IPUMS. The left panel of Figure Nr. 3 
(see page 38) summarizes the average information for Latin America and 
the right panel shows a scatter plot of all the countries and years conside-
red. The pattern obtained matches the WDI data discussed above, where, 
on average, the participation of women in the labor market increased and 
the fertility decreased over the last three decades.
Regarding the descriptive statistics in the subsample of mothers, the 
average labor force participation in Latin America, as captured by the Wor-
ked for pay indicator, was 20% in 1980, 25% in 1990 and 32% in 2000, with 
variability between countries that decreases over time. These numbers are 
lower than those of the U.S. (46% in 1980, 55% in 1990 and 58% in 2000). 
The average number of children in Latin America was 3.3, 3.1 and 2.8 for 
1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively, and higher than the average number of 
children in the U.S. (approximately 2.6 in the three censuses). In the case 
of the More than 2 children indicator, 63% of mothers with at least two chil-
dren had a third child in 1980, 58% did so in 1990 and 50% in 2000. In the 
U.S. these percentages are barely 41%. Finally, it is worth noting that on 
average Latin American mothers are less educated than those of the U.S., 
although there is much variability across countries.12
12. The tables with the information for each country can be found in the online appendix.
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Figure Nr. 3: Female labor participation and number of children 
(Latin America)
Source: own calculations based on IPUMS-International.
IV. Internal Validity 
The analysis in this section deals with the threats to the validity of the 
identification strategy in its application to Latin American countries. The 
precondition for the application of the Same-sex strategy is the existence 
of a first-stage relationship between the sex mix of children and further 
childbearing, which is verified in the next section. However, the crucial 
point is whether the variation in fertility induced by sex preferences can 
be considered to be exogenous. Although this cannot be tested formally, 
the evidence provided here guarantees a greater reliability of the results 
of the work.
Establishing the case for the randomness of the instrument is relative-
ly straightforward. The gender of a child is a naturally occurring random 
event, and the sex mix is thus “as good as randomly assigned” (Angrist, 
2001). However, a problem arises with extreme forms of son preference that 
lead to the neglect of daughters in basic healthcare and education, or when 
sex screening techniques are widely available, and they result in selective 
abortions and even infanticide (Das Gupta, 2009). In those cases, the sex 
mix is manipulated and might be correlated with labor supply (the idea that 
boys contribute relatively more to household welfare compared to girls). 
The inspection of sex ratios by age and household consumption data can be 
useful to check if this problem is present in Latin American countries.
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Figure Nr. 4 presents the ratio of boys to girls aged zero to four years 
old for selected countries in 2000. In Latin America and the U.S. the ratios 
are similar and slightly higher than one, which is an almost universal fea-
ture of demographic data. The interesting result is that the ratios in Latin 
America are substantially lower than in extreme cases like China (CHN), 
India (IND) and South Korea (KOR). This evidence suggests no discrimi-
nation against girls in Latin America in the form of neglected healthcare or 
feeding those results in higher mortality among girls.
Figure Nr. 4: Sex Ratios - 
Number of Boys / Number of Girls, 0 to 4 years old, 2000
Source: own calculations based on data from United Nations Population Division, 
World Population Prospects.
Further evidence on the effect of son preferences can be inferred from 
household’s consumption patterns and the budget spent on goods for 
children of different sex. Table Nr. 1 presents data on budget shares of 
child-related goods and mean differences by sex composition of children 
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for Argentina (upper panel) and Colombia (lower panel).13 If girls were 
discriminated, parents of boys would spend a higher proportion of their 
budget on food, health, clothing or education, among other goods. How-
ever, in the table none of the differences for parents of two boys or two 
girls are different from zero at the normal levels of significance.
Another point made in the literature is posed by Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (2000) and discussed by CG for Argentina and Mexico. Rosenz-
weig and Wolpin (2000) argue that in rural India same-sex siblings are 
related to substantially lower levels of expenditure on child-related goods. 
These hand-me-down savings could directly affect the marginal utility 
of leisure and the cost of raising a child, and ultimately the labor supply 
through mechanisms other than the change in fertility, invalidating the 
exclusion restriction. Nonetheless, the evidence in Table Nr. 1 shows that 
the expenditure patterns of households in Argentina and Colombia are 
not significantly affected by the sex composition of children. Moreover, in 
the two cases where the difference between budget shares was statistically 
significant, the sign contradicts the presence of economies of scale, since 
households whose first two children are girls spend a higher share of their 
budget on education and clothing.
Finally, while the independence of the sex mix with respect to potential 
outcomes cannot be established directly, if the instrument is truly random 
there should not be systematic differences in exogenous characteristics of 
parents of same-sex and mixed-sex siblings. Using census data this simple 
check shows that in general women whose first two children were of the 
same sex and mothers of mixed-sex children cannot be distinguished sta-
tistically in terms of age, age at first birth, house ownership and education 
13. Data for Argentina is based on the 2004/2005 Household Expenditure Survey and data for Colombia 
corresponds to the 2003 Quality of Life Survey, both are nationally representative and were processed 
following the same criteria as in the census samples. Argentina has two additional categories since it was 
possible to separate child clothing and education expenditures from adult’s expenditures. While it would 
be desirable to use expenditure surveys for the 14 Latin American countries considered here, household 
surveys are unusual and also collecting and processing them exceeds the scope of work.
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levels.14 In any case, 2SLS models can accommodate covariates to control 
for any effect on the outcome of interest.
Table Nr. 1: Differences in budget shares 
by sex composition of children
First two children
Share (%) Same-sex  Two-boys Two-girls
Argentina - 2004/2005
Food and beverages 34.0 0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Clothing and footwear 9.4 0.000 -0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Clothing and footwear (children) 2.9 0.003 0.000 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Health and related expenditures 4.9 -0.000 -0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 4.8 0.002 -0.002 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Education (children) 2.8 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Colombia - 2003
Food and beverages 28.8 0.002 0.000 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Clothing and footwear 7.3 -0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Health and related expenditures 2.1 0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 5.0 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: differences in means (mean of the relevant group minus mean of the rest of the population) and 
their standard errors (in parentheses). *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
The sample consists of 6,815 (Argentina) and 5,825 (Colombia) women aged 18-45 with two or more 
children aged 18 or younger. Source: Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de los Hogares, INDEC, 2004/2005 
(Argentina) and Encuesta de Calidad de Vida, 2003 (Colombia).
14. This was done by running individual regressions of each characteristic on the instrument. The own-
ership variable is used as a proxy for the household socioeconomic status. The results can be found in the 
online appendix.
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The indirect evidence presented in this section is thus consistent with 
the internal validity of the Same-sex indicator as an instrument of fertility 
in the model of labor supply.15
V. Results
This section presents the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the relationship be-
tween fertility and female labor supply (equation (6)). The analysis was 
carried out separately on all women and married women. Also, the age of 
mothers, ages at first birth, sex of the first and second child were included 
as standard controls.16 In order to get a visual understanding of the effects 
over the three decades considered, the coefficients and their confidence 
intervals are reproduced graphically.17
V.1. OLS Estimates 
Figure Nr. 5 presents the simple OLS estimates between Worked for pay and 
More than 2 children for each country spanning the three decades. In all the 
cases there is a negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1% 
level. The effect is relatively constant over time and the magnitude is simi-
lar between the countries of Latin America. In Latin America in the year 
2000 women with more than two children were on average 11.3 percent-
age points (p.p.) less likely to participate in the labor force compared to 
women with only two children, ceteris paribus. In the U.S. that probability 
is -14.8 p.p. for the year 2000, and it is stronger than in Latin America in 
all the decades.18
15. Huber and Mellace (2011) developed a test to assess the validity of an instrumental variable in 
just-identified models and applied it to the AE’s database finding evidence for the validity of Same-sex.
16. The over identified model only includes the sex of the first child.
17. The tables with all the specifications can be found in the online appendix.
18. While useful for comparison purposes, it should be noted that the OLS and IV coefficients are not 
necessarily comparable since IV estimates identify the causal effect only for the subpopulation of com-
pliers, while OLS coefficient provides a (potentially biased) estimate of the average effect for the whole 
population.
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Figure Nr. 5: Point estimates and 90% confidence intervals - OLS 
(all women)
Source: own calculations based on IPUMS-International. Note: the vertical axis shows the coefficient 
of more than 2 children (estimated by OLS).
V.2. SLS Estimates - First stage 
As mentioned in the analysis of the internal validity, a precondition for the 
application of the Same-sex strategy is the existence of a first-stage relation-
ship between the sex mix of children and further childbearing. Figure Nr. 
6 summarizes these correlations in all the countries and years considered 
in the study. Except for Panama 1980, Same-sex has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on fertility at the 1% level. Women with same-sex children are 
on average more likely to have a third child than women with mixed-sex 
children, ceteris paribus. However, in Latin America the effect is substan-
tially lower (approximately 3 p.p.) than in the U.S. (approximately 6 p.p.). 
These results seem to be relatively constant over time.
Regarding the Two-boys and Two-girls instruments, there is a higher 
probability of further childbearing for parents of girls (3 p.p.) than for 
parents of boys (1.9 p.p.). As in AE and CG, this result suggests a moder-
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ate bias towards sons which, based on the evidence of the previous sec-
tion, might be an idiosyncratic feature of the countries under study, and 
therefore does not constitute a threat to the exogeneity of the instrument. 
To sum up, these first-stage relationships reveal that a preference for a 
gender-balanced family (with a moderate bias for sons) is present in Latin 
American countries, but it is weaker than in the United States.
Figure Nr. 6: First-stage coefficients and 99% confidence intervals - 
Same-sex (all women)
Source: own calculations based on IPUMS-International. 
Note: the vertical axis shows the effect of same-sex on more than 2 children.
V.3.SLS Estimates - Second stage 
Figure Nr. 7 reports the IV estimates of the effect of fertility on women’s 
labor supply. In general, the point estimates are very imprecise and sta-
tistically insignificant. As can be seen from the figure, the 2SLS estimates 
are centered around the zero-line. The result is robust in nearly all the 
countries and years and is the main result of the work. There are only three 
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countries where a significant negative causal effect is found. In the U.S. in 
1980 having more than two children reduces women’s labor supply in 12 
p.p.,19 14.5 p.p. in 1990 and 6.1 p.p. in 2000. In the case of Latin American 
countries the effects are indistinguishable from zero in 1980, while in 1990 
Argentina is the only one with a negative and significant effect at 1%. In 
Mexico 2000 there is a negative effect at the 10% level.20
Figure Nr. 7: Point estimates and 90% confidence intervals 
- IV Same-sex (all women)
Source: own calculations based on IPUMS-International. 
Note: the vertical axis shows the effect of More than 2 children on the probability of working (estimated 
by 2SLS).
19. The estimated coefficient and standard error in the U.S. coincides exactly with that obtained by AE 
for 1980.
20. Despite using the same criteria to process the data and using the same variables, the results for Ar-
gentina 1991 are twice as high as that of CG, but in Mexico 2000 they are the same. This can be explained 
as the authors used a sample of 50% for Argentina (599,941 mothers) compared to the 10% (182,824 
mothers) used in this work. In the case of Mexico both studies used a sample of 10%.
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The results from the over identified model do not differ much from the 
case in which Same-sex is the only instrument. In other words, the use of two 
instruments improves neither the magnitude nor the accuracy of the results.21
The last exercise conducted was to replicate the individual estimates 
but this time using a pool of mothers for the whole of Latin America in 
each decade, and also a pool for the three decades altogether. Table Nr. 2 
summarizes the results. In the sample of all mothers, OLS estimates agree 
in sign and magnitude with those found at the country level. Meanwhile, 
IV estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, when 
considering the sample of married mothers, the effect of having more than 
two children on the labor supply for those women whose fertility deci-
sions are changed by the instrument is negative and statistically signifi-
cant. The coefficients are approximately half of those estimated by OLS.22
Table Nr. 2: OLS and 2SLS estimates of fertility and female labor supply. 
Pool of countries from Latin America (LA) (all and married (beginning)
LA 1980 LA 1990 LA 2000 LA 80-90-00 LA 1980 LA 1990 LA 2000 LA 80-90-00
ALL WOMEN MARRIED WOMEN
Panel A – OLS
More than 2 children -0.095*** -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.098*** -0.092***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Panel B - Instrumental Variables
(1)Same-sex 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
(2)More than 2 children 0.024 -0.029 -0.028 -0.019 -0.027 -0.041* -0.051** -0.042***
(0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.030) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014)
21. In the over identified model the Sargan test allows to analyze whether the results when using Two-
boys are statistically different from using Two-girls as the only instrument. This is also a way of check-
ing whether the sex of a child interferes with parent’s labor supply for reasons other than family size. In 
most countries and years considered, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, evidence for the validity of 
the instruments.
22. Results similar to those obtained for female labor force participation also apply to hours of work (only 
available in 7 countries) and to an indicator for independent vs dependent work, as dependent variables. 
The same happens with the number of children as the endogenous independent variable; a sample of 
mothers with three or more children; heterogeneous effects by education level. The estimates tell essen-
tially the same story and can be checked in the online appendix.
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Panel C - Instrumental Variables – over identified
(1)Two-boys 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(1) Two-girls 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(2) More than 2 children 0.055 -0.010 -0.013 0.001 -0.005 -0.025 -0.042* -0.028*
(0.037) (0.024) (0.027) (0.016) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015)
Sargan p-value (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Observations 751,101 1,585,451 1,757,201 4,093,753 686,749 1,436,891 1,508,412 3,632,052
(3) Partial-R2 0.00095 0.00108 0.00087 0.00096 0.00111 0.00126 0.00106 0.00115
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. Other covariates in the models are Age, Age at first birth, indicators for sex of first and second 
children, plus year dummies, country dummies and interactions. Samples as described in the text and 
the appendix. (1) Coefficient of the first stage using More than 2 children as dependent variable; (2) 
Coefficient of the second stage using Worked for pay as dependent variable; (3) Goodness of t between 
More than 2 children and Same-sex after controlling for the other covariates in the model.
V.4. Possible explanations 
A group of interrelated technical and social factors could be explaining the 
absence of a causal effect in Latin American countries. The former have to 
do with weak or low quality instruments, and the latter relate to welfare 
systems and social norms of Latin American families.
The technical explanation of the imprecise coefficients in the second stage 
can be attributed to the low quality of the first stage. A usual way of assess-
ing this quality is through two key statistics, the partial-R2 and the F-statistic 
(Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995).23 In all the countries and years, the F-statis-
tics are all well above the rule of thumb value of 10 which could be due to the 
use of census data. The remarkable result is that the partial-R2 is extremely 
23. The partial-R2 isolates the explanatory power of Same-sex over More than 2 children when controlling 
for age, age at first birth, the sex of the first and second child; the F-statistic in the just-identified model is 
simply the squared t-statistic, and in the over-identified model, it is a joint significance test of Two-boys 
and Two-girls. Following Staiger and Stock (1997), it is usual to conclude that an instrument is weak when 
its F-statistic is lower than 10. However, this is an ad hoc rule and the authors themselves remark that 
instruments can be weak in large samples even when the statistic is significant at the conventional levels.
Table Nr. 2: OLS and 2SLS estimates of fertility and female labor supply. 
Pool of countries from Latin America (LA) (all and married (conclusion)
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low in all cases, that is, the variability of Same-sex explains the variability of 
fertility very little, and this result is “inherited” by the second stage.24
The problem of weak instruments in most countries exacerbates the 
inherent low precision in the IV estimates compared to OLS, reflected in 
the large confidence intervals of IV estimates in Figure Nr. 7.25 In the face 
of this loss of efficiency, the interpretation of the results calls for caution.
What remains to be clarified is why, despite the low explanatory power 
of the instrument, there are three countries where a negative causal effect 
is identified. This result may be due to the magnitude of the Same-sex coef-
ficients. Even when the correlations between fertility and Same-sex were 
positive and accurate in all the countries, it is also desirable for the coeffi-
cients to be high. For example, if less than 1% of the mothers in the sample 
had an additional child when the first two were of the same sex, it would 
be very di cult to detect the effect of that additional child on the labor sup-
ply for that group of compliers. In the U.S., the coefficients for the first stage 
(approximately 6 p.p.) were larger than those of Latin America (approxi-
mately 3 p.p.). Moreover, even though the F-statistics for Latin American 
countries were larger than the mentioned threshold, they were notably 
lower than in the U.S. and the same happened with the partial-R2. This 
explains why with a stronger first stage in the U.S., it is possible to identify 
a causal effect. A similar mechanism operates in the case of Argentina and 
Mexico, although less strongly.
Regarding the estimates with the pool of countries and years, the nega-
tive effect in the sample of married women could reflect a less binding 
budget constraint relative to unmarried women. That is, married women 
have the option to pool resources with spouses with an income effect that 
makes their labor supply more elastic, hence adjusting the intensity of 
their participation.
In the social explanation, a weak first stage for Latin American countries 
can be related to social and cultural factors. Even though evidence shows 
24. These results are available in the last two rows of the tables with country level information in the 
online appendix.
25. The variance of the coefficient from the IV estimates can be written as V(βIV ) = V (βOLS)=R2x;z, where 
R2x;z is the partial-R2 corresponding to the first-stage. When the explanatory power of the instrument is 
low, the standard error of the second stage is magnified (Wooldridge, 2009).
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that the size of Latin American families has fallen in the last decades, the 
equilibrium size is still above that of developed countries (Chioda, 2011). 
Then, women with preferences for large families can be indifferent to the 
sex of their first two children since they may end up having mixed-sex 
children anyway. In that case, the relevant margin where the mixed-sex 
sibling preference operates strongly could be at higher parities.26
Beyond the problem of weak instruments and the low precision of the 
estimates, there are other factors that make women labor supply less re-
sponsive to fertility in Latin American countries compared to the U.S. First, 
Latin American households have lower average family income than devel-
oped countries. Thus, the economic needs of women to work and supple-
ment those earnings are more binding (Chioda, 2011). Second, in develop-
ing countries with large rural sectors it is probably easier for mothers to 
combine labor and household chores since the physical separation between 
these activities is smaller than in industrialized countries (Van der Stoep, 
2008).27 Third, since households are larger, older siblings or other relatives 
are more likely to provide informal childcare freeing up time for mothers to 
pursue labor market opportunities (Van der Stoep, 2008).28 Finally, parental 
leave appears as an important alternative to conciliate family responsibili-
ties with work. While Latin American countries provide on average three 
paid months of maternity leave (ECLAC, 2011), the U.S. mandates up to 12 
weeks of (potentially unpaid) job-protected leave.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the causal relationship between fertility and female la-
bor supply in 14 countries in Latin America and the U.S. using census data 
spanning three decades. The strategy followed builds on an instrumental 
variable approach, introduced by Angrist and Evans (1998), which relies 
on parental sex preferences as a source of exogenous variation in fertility.
Even though OLS estimates suggest a negative and statistically signifi-
26. In practice this implies working with samples of mothers with three or more children, and thus there 
is a trade-o between stronger first-stages and smaller samples.
27. This may not be the case here because the indicator Worked for pay rules out unpaid family work.
28. In developed countries this could be compensated by the broader access to formal childcare like nurs-
eries and daycare centers.
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cant relationship between fertility and mothers’ labor supply in each Latin 
American country, 2SLS estimates fail to identify a causal effect in most 
of them. Namely, the average effect of moving from a two-child family to 
a larger one is statistically zero for those women whose fertility decisions 
are changed by the instrument (compliers). The results for the U.S., Argen-
tina and Mexico agree with those reported in previous studies. When con-
sidering a pool of countries in Latin America, a negative and statistically 
significant causal effect is found in the sample of married women.
Despite having highly accurate first-stage estimates (and indirect evi-
dence consistent with the internal validity of the instrument), the group of 
compliers is small compared to that of developed countries like the U.S. 
Moreover, the analysis of the quality of the instrument reveals a weak ex-
planatory power of sibling sex composition on fertility. The problem of 
weak instruments entails a loss of precision in the second-stage, with large 
standard errors that make the interpretation of IV estimates meaningless.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Countries, years and official source of census
Country Year of Census Fraction (%) Census agency
Argentina ARG 1980, 1991, 2001 10 Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC)
Bolivia BOL 1976, 1992, 2001 10 National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Coordination
Brazil BRA 1980, 1991, 2000 5-6 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica
Chile CHL 1982, 1992, 2002 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas
Colombia COL 1985, 1993, 2005 10 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE)
Costa Rica CRI 1984, 2000 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos
Ecuador ECU 1982, 1990, 2001 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos
El Salvador SLV 1992, 2007 10 General Directorate of Statistics and Censuses
Mexico MEX 1990, 2000 10-10.6 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI)
Nicaragua NIC 1995, 2005 10 National Institute of Statistics and Censuses
Panama PAN 1980, 1990, 2000 10 Contraloria General de la Republica, Direccion de Estadistica y Censo
Peru PER 1993, 2007 10 National Institute of Statistics and Computing
Uruguay URY 1985, 1996 10 National Institute of Statistics
Venezuela VEN 1981, 1990, 2001 10 O cina Central de Estadística e Informática
United States USA 1980, 1990, 2000 5 U.S. Census Bureau
Source: IPUMS-International.
A.2. Matching between mothers and children
The study of female labor supply and fertility required a subsample of 
mothers with the characteristics of their children linked to them. Other stu-
dies had to restrict the sample to women who are heads of household or 
spouses of the head since they only had access to a variable that describes the 
relationship of the individual to the head of household. In this work, I use the 
variable momloc, which indicates whether or not the person’s mother lived 
in the same household and, if so, it gives the person number of the mother. 
Thus, it was easier to link the characteristics of children and their mothers, 
and for those households with more than one mother it was possible to iden-
tify each son separately obtaining larger samples than the other studies.
Since the identification strategy uses the Same-sex indicator for whether 
the sex of the second child matches the sex of the first child, the sample 
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was restricted to mothers with at least two children. In addition, and as in 
other studies with similar settings, the sample was restricted to women 
aged 21 to 35 years, whose first child was under 18 years old, and whose 
second child was at least 1 year old. On the one hand, this is because few 
women under 21 have two children, and on the other hand, it is common 
for children over 18 years to leave their parents’ house for educational or 
employment purposes, and censuses do not keep track of the children as 
they become independent. Restriction to mothers aged 35 years or less 
means that the cut to age at 18 for the oldest child does not generate a 
highly selected sample. Finally, the observations on which the age of the 
mother and spouse at the birth of the first child was under 14 were discar-
ded, since these cases may constitute data entry errors.
A.3. A note on weighting
Solon, Haider and Wooldridge (2013) discuss the use of sampling weights 
in two situations: to estimate population descriptive statistics and to esti-
mate causal effects. The first situation is obvious when someone is working 
with population samples. In the second case, the motive for weighting is 
to achieve consistent estimates by correcting for endogenous sampling. If 
the sample is systematically unrepresentative of the population in a known 
manner (e.g. oversampling of low-income households in the context of Min-
cer regressions) the estimates could be inconsistent. The sampling would be 
endogenous because the sampling criterion, i.e. the population income, is 
correlated with the error term in the regression. When performing IV esti-
mates, one would need to weight the orthogonality conditions by the inver-
se probabilities of selection in order to get consistent estimates. However, 
an important point stressed in Wooldridge (1999) is that, if the sampling 
probabilities vary exogenously instead of endogenously, weighting might 
be unnecessary for consistency and harmful for precision.29
29. Solon et al. (2013) provide an example in which a linear regression model, including state dummy 
variables among the explanatory variables, is estimated, with a U.S. sample that over-represents certain 
states (as in the Current Population Survey). Then, if the model is correctly specified, the error term is 
not related to the sampling criterion and weighting is unnecessary. Moreover, if the error term were ho-
moscedastic prior to weighting, the weighting would induce heteroscedasticity and imprecise estimates.
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In the present work, most of IPUMS samples are “at”, i.e., each per-
son in the sample represents a fixed number of people in the population. 
Only 30% of the samples used have weights with some records represen-
ting more cases than others. This means that some people with certain 
characteristics are overrepresented in the samples, and others are unde-
rrepresented. In all cases, the databases provide the harmonized variable 
WTPER. For instance, in Argentina 2001 all the records have a weighting 
of 10%, and in 1980 and 1990 the weight varies within the sample. Then, it 
is important to include sampling weights in the regressions at the country 
and year level. However, when using the pool of mothers for the whole 
of Latin America, the inclusion of sampling weights is less obvious since 
they are defined within the country but not between countries. In this case, 
country and year dummies were included as control variables.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 56  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Ta
bl
e 
A
.2
: D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s 
- 1
98
0s
A
rg
en
tin
a
Bo
liv
ia
Br
az
il
C
hi
le
C
ol
om
bi
a
C
. R
ic
a
Ec
ua
do
r
Pa
na
m
a
U
ru
gu
ay
V
en
ez
.
LA
U
.S
.
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
0.2
0
0.
15
0.
20
0.
16
0.
26
0.1
8
0.1
4
0.
27
0.
33
0.
23
0.
20
0.
46
(=
1 
if 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.3
6)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.3
6)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.5
0)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.5
3
0.
70
0.
66
0.
51
0.
59
0.5
9
0.6
9
0.
68
0.
47
0.
67
0.
63
0.
41
(=
1 
if 
ha
d 
m
or
e t
ha
n 
2)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
9)
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
2.9
3.
3
3.4
2.
8
3.
1
3.1
3.4
3.
4
2.
8
3.
4
3.
3
2.
6
(1
.2
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.5
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.4
)
(1
.4
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.5
)
(1
.5
)
(0
.9
)
A
ge
29
.6
29
.2
29
.2
29
.6
29
.1
29
.0
28
.9
29
.1
29
.9
28
.8
29
.2
30
.1
(3
.8
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.7
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.6
)
A
ge
 a
t 1
st
 b
ir
th
21
.5
20
.5
20
.7
20
.5
20
.1
20
.1
20
.1
19
.8
21
.1
20
.0
20
.6
20
.8
(3
.5
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.3
)
(3
.3
)
(3
.3
)
(3
.1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.5
08
0.
49
8
0.
49
7
0.
50
9
0.
51
0
0.5
02
0.5
02
0.
50
6
0.
50
8
0.
50
7
0.
50
2
0.
50
4
(=
1 
if 
sa
m
e-
se
x 
sib
lin
gs
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.2
58
0.
25
5
0.
25
4
0.
26
1
0.
26
1
0.2
60
0.2
61
0.
26
7
0.
26
2
0.
26
3
0.
25
7
0.
26
1
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e b
oy
s)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
39
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.2
47
0.
24
1
0.
23
8
0.
24
5
0.
24
3
0.2
38
0.2
39
0.
23
6
0.
24
3
0.
23
8
0.
24
0
0.
24
0
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e g
irl
s)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
30
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
27
)
Bo
y 
1s
t
0.5
09
0.
50
4
0.
51
1
0.
51
4
0.
51
2
0.5
11
0.5
11
0.
51
6
0.
50
9
0.
51
3
0.
51
1
0.
51
2
(=
1 
if 
fir
st
 w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Bo
y 
2n
d
0.5
02
0.
50
9
0.
50
5
0.
50
4
0.
50
7
0.5
11
0.5
11
0.
51
6
0.
51
0
0.
51
2
0.
50
6
0.
51
0
(=
1 
if 
se
co
nd
 w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(y
ea
rs
)
7.1
3
2.
64
3.
54
7.
48
5.
37
6.6
2
5.3
3
6.
43
8.
12
5.
79
4.
72
11
.9
6
(3
.9
2)
(3
.3
5)
(3
.4
7)
(3
.7
3)
(3
.6
2)
(3
.6
0)
(4
.0
1)
(3
.9
7)
(3
.8
8)
(3
.5
4)
(3
.8
9)
(2
.4
1)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
12
2,3
44
22
,5
24
27
9,
04
7
50
,9
84
13
0,
98
0
14
,14
7
40
,9
27
9,
99
6
10
,7
82
72
,9
66
75
4,
69
7
47
6,
58
2
So
ur
ce
: o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
IP
U
M
S-
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l. 
N
ot
e: 
m
ea
n 
an
d 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
). 
Sa
m
pl
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 w
om
en
 a
ge
d 
21
-3
5 
ye
ar
s 
w
it
h 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n.
TORTAROLO |  57 
Ta
bl
a 
A
.3
: D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s 
- 1
99
0s
A
rg
en
tin
a
Bo
liv
ia
Br
as
il
C
hi
le
C
ol
om
bi
a
Ec
ua
do
r
El
 S
al
v.
M
ex
ic
o
N
ic
ar
ag
.
Pa
na
m
Pe
ru
U
ru
gu
ay
V
en
ez
.
LA
U
.S
.
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
0.
33
0.
32
0.
30
0.
19
0.
25
0.
23
0.
29
0.
15
0.
28
0.
25
0.
17
0.
44
0.
27
0.
25
0.
55
(=
1 
if 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.4
2)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.3
5)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.5
0)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
57
0.
68
0.
54
0.
42
0.
53
0.
62
0.
61
0.
66
0.
69
0.
60
0.
61
0.
44
0.
61
0.
58
0.
40
(=
1 
if 
ha
d 
m
or
e t
ha
n 
2)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
9)
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
3.
0
3.
3
2.
9
2.
6
2.
9
3.
2
3.
1
3.
3
3.
5
3.
1
3.
1
2.
7
3.
2
3.
1
2.
6
(1
.2
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.2
)
(0
.8
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.4
)
(1
.5
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.3
)
(1
.3
)
(0
.8
)
A
ge
29
.8
29
.4
29
.6
30
.0
29
.5
29
.3
29
.1
29
.3
28
.5
29
.2
29
.4
30
.2
29
.4
29
.5
30
.4
(3
.8
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.6
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(4
.1
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.7
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.5
)
A
ge
 a
t 1
st
 b
ir
th
20
.8
20
.3
20
.5
20
.8
20
.1
20
.1
19
.6
19
.8
19
.1
19
.9
20
.3
21
.0
20
.0
20
.3
21
.4
(3
.4
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.3
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.0
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.4
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.6
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
50
8
0.
49
7
0.
49
2
0.
50
4
0.
51
0
0.
50
4
0.
50
9
0.
50
3
0.
50
8
0.
50
9
0.
50
5
0.
50
2
0.
50
6
0.
50
0
0.
50
4
(=
1 
if 
sa
m
e-
se
x 
sib
lin
gs
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
25
7
0.
25
4
0.
25
5
0.
26
2
0.
26
3
0.
26
3
0.
28
2
0.
25
7
0.
26
2
0.
26
6
0.
25
6
0.
25
4
0.
26
0
0.
25
8
0.
26
1
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e b
oy
s)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
50
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
42
)
(0
.4
36
)
(0
.4
35
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.4
39
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
24
8
0.
24
0
0.
23
4
0.
23
8
0.
24
4
0.
23
9
0.
22
4
0.
24
3
0.
24
1
0.
23
9
0.
24
7
0.
24
6
0.
24
0
0.
23
9
0.
23
9
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e g
irl
s)
(0
.4
32
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
23
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
17
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.4
30
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
27
)
Bo
y 
1s
t
0.
50
5
0.
50
7
0.
51
2
0.
51
1
0.
51
3
0.
51
3
0.
54
3
0.
50
9
0.
51
4
0.
51
5
0.
50
5
0.
50
8
0.
51
5
0.
51
1
0.
51
3
(=
1 
if 
fir
st
 w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.4
98
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Bo
y 
2n
d
0.
50
5
0.
50
7
0.
50
9
0.
51
3
0.
50
6
0.
51
1
0.
51
4
0.
50
6
0.
50
7
0.
51
2
0.
50
3
0.
49
9
0.
50
5
0.
50
7
0.
51
0
(=
1 
if 
se
co
nd
 w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(y
ea
rs
)
8.
5
5.
5
5.
2
8.
9
6.
0
6.
9
4.
8
5.
7
4.
9
8.
0
6.
5
8.
1
6.
7
6.
0
.
(3
.9
)
(4
.4
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.4
)
(3
.4
)
(4
.5
)
(4
.3
)
(3
.8
)
(4
.1
)
(4
.1
)
(4
.1
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.8
)
(4
.0
)
.
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
18
3,
36
6
27
,8
99
43
2,
30
3
63
,0
97
15
4,
81
7
48
,7
37
24
,0
90
41
6,
85
6
25
,0
35
11
,6
91
10
2,
86
4
10
,4
10
89
,5
08
1,
59
0,
67
3
48
1,
03
9
So
ur
ce
: o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
IP
U
M
S-
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l. 
N
ot
e: 
m
ea
n 
an
d 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
). 
Sa
m
pl
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 w
om
en
 a
ge
d 
21
-3
5 
ye
ar
s 
w
it
h 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 58  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Ta
bl
a 
A
.4
: D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s 
- 2
00
0s
A
rg
en
t.
Bo
liv
ia
Br
as
il
C
hi
le
C
ol
om
b.
C
. R
ic
a
Ec
ua
do
r
El
 S
al
v.
M
ex
ic
o
N
ic
ar
ag
.
Pa
na
m
Pe
ru
V
en
ez
.
LA
U
.S
.
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
0.
28
0.
38
0.
38
0.
27
0.
31
0.
24
0.
28
0.
36
0.
27
0.
32
0.
27
0.
28
0.
32
0.
32
0.
58
(=
1 
if 
w
or
ke
d 
fo
r p
ay
)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.4
5)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.4
9)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
55
0.
62
0.
46
0.
34
0.
47
0.
52
0.
53
0.
50
0.
55
0.
56
0.
55
0.
46
0.
54
0.
50
0.
42
(=
1 
if 
ha
d 
m
or
e t
ha
n 
2)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
9)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
8)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.5
0)
(0
.4
9)
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
3.
0
3.
1
2.
7
2.
5
2.
7
2.
8
2.
9
2.
8
2.
9
3.
0
3.
0
2.
7
2.
9
2.
8
2.
6
(1
.3
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.0
)
(0
.7
)
(1
.0
)
(1
.0
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.0
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.2
)
(1
.0
)
(1
.1
)
(1
.1
)
(0
.9
)
A
ge
29
.7
29
.3
29
.6
30
.6
29
.6
29
.9
29
.3
29
.7
29
.5
28
.9
29
.5
29
.9
29
.5
29
.6
30
.4
(3
.8
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.4
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.7
)
(3
.8
)
(4
.0
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.7
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.8
)
(3
.6
)
A
ge
 a
t 1
st
 b
ir
th
20
.3
20
.2
20
.1
20
.6
19
.9
20
.0
19
.9
19
.5
20
.1
19
.0
20
.0
20
.1
19
.8
20
.1
21
.5
(3
.4
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.1
)
(3
.1
)
(2
.9
)
(3
.3
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.7
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
52
1
0.
50
4
0.
50
1
0.
50
2
0.
50
2
0.
50
3
0.
50
8
0.
50
9
0.
50
2
0.
50
8
0.
50
0
0.
50
7
0.
50
4
0.
50
4
0.
50
5
(=
1 
if 
sa
m
e-
se
x 
sib
lin
gs
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
26
7
0.
26
2
0.
25
9
0.
26
0
0.
26
2
0.
26
2
0.
26
2
0.
25
8
0.
25
8
0.
26
1
0.
26
1
0.
26
2
0.
26
0
0.
26
0
0.
26
1
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e b
oy
s)
(0
.4
43
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.4
39
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
25
1
0.
23
9
0.
23
9
0.
23
9
0.
23
7
0.
23
8
0.
24
3
0.
24
6
0.
24
1
0.
24
2
0.
23
6
0.
24
2
0.
24
0
0.
24
1
0.
24
0
(=
1 
if 
bo
th
 w
er
e g
irl
s)
(0
.4
33
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
25
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.4
29
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
27
)
Bo
y 
1s
t
0.
50
8
0.
51
0
0.
51
2
0.
51
4
0.
51
5
0.
51
2
0.
51
2
0.
50
8
0.
51
0
0.
51
5
0.
51
7
0.
51
0
0.
51
2
0.
51
1
0.
51
2
(=
1 
if 
 rs
t w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Bo
y 
2n
d
0.
50
8
0.
51
2
0.
50
8
0.
50
7
0.
51
0
0.
51
1
0.
50
7
0.
50
5
0.
50
7
0.
50
5
0.
50
8
0.
51
0
0.
50
8
0.
50
8
0.
50
9
(=
1 
if 
se
co
nd
 w
as
 a
 b
oy
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.5
00
)
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(y
ea
rs
)
9.
0
6.
6
5.
9
10
.1
7.
3
7.
3
7.
6
6.
2
7.
4
5.
4
8.
3
7.
8
7.
8
7.
0
.
(3
.6
)
(4
.4
)
(3
.7
)
(3
.5
)
(4
.0
)
(3
.5
)
(4
.4
)
(4
.5
)
(3
.8
)
(4
.1
)
(4
.0
)
(3
.9
)
(3
.2
)
(3
.9
)
.
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
8,
32
1
34
,4
36
45
9,
38
5
52
,0
09
16
7,
54
1
19
,1
37
51
,8
87
27
,3
02
55
9,
99
4
26
,9
44
13
,0
16
10
6,
98
2
10
5,
69
0
1,
76
2,
64
4
42
3,
54
9
So
ur
ce
: o
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
IP
U
M
S-
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l. 
N
ot
e: 
m
ea
n 
an
d 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
). 
Sa
m
pl
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 w
om
en
 a
ge
d 
21
-3
5 
ye
ar
s 
w
it
h 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n.
TORTAROLO |  59 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.5
: O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 1
98
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(A
LL
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
C
R
I
EC
U
PA
N
U
R
Y
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
80
**
*
-0
.0
81
**
*
-0
.0
85
**
*
-0
.0
83
**
*
-0
.1
11
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.1
05
**
*
-0
.1
39
**
*
-0
.1
18
**
*
-0
.1
28
**
*
-0
.1
81
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
01
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
04
6*
**
0.
01
3*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
04
4*
**
0.
01
4*
**
0.
01
3
0.
04
2*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
05
3*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
07
2
0.
20
8
-0
.0
05
0.
01
2
0.
03
5
0.
04
7
0.
33
6
0.
07
0
-0
.3
06
0.
06
2
-0
.1
20
**
*
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.3
74
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.1
22
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.1
45
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.7
40
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.0
26
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
02
9*
**
0.
01
6*
*
0.
01
8*
**
0.
01
2*
*
0.
02
7*
**
0.
03
7*
**
0.
01
0*
0.
00
6
0.
02
7*
*
0.
02
0*
**
0.
04
1*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
05
7*
**
0.
01
0
0.
02
2*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
04
5*
**
0.
01
6*
**
0.
01
7
0.
05
1*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
05
8*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
08
8
0.
24
1
0.
03
2
-0
.0
37
0.
06
1
0.
04
6
0.
39
2
0.
34
4
-0
.2
89
0.
10
0
-0
.1
18
**
*
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.3
89
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.1
57
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.8
11
)
(0
.2
19
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.0
28
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.7
46
)
(0
.7
92
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.2
88
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.3
56
)
(0
.5
15
)
(0
.6
94
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.0
58
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
12
1,
83
2
22
,4
92
27
7,
60
6
50
,7
79
13
0,
26
5
14
,0
92
40
,8
28
9,
96
5
10
,7
51
72
,4
91
47
4,
84
6
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
25
0.
00
03
0.
00
07
0.
00
08
0.
00
12
0.
00
23
0.
00
03
0.
00
02
0.
00
21
0.
00
09
0.
00
32
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
18
0.
7
5.
7
19
3.
6
41
.7
15
9.
2
33
.1
11
.8
2.
0
22
.3
68
.8
1,
54
8.
3
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 60  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34 T
ab
le
 A
.6
. O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 1
98
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(M
A
R
R
IE
D
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
C
R
I
EC
U
PA
N
U
R
Y
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
65
**
*
-0
.0
56
**
*
-0
.0
66
**
*
-0
.0
65
**
*
-0
.0
89
**
*
-0
.0
76
**
*
-0
.0
92
**
*
-0
.1
25
**
*
-0
.1
14
**
*
-0
.1
00
**
*
-0
.1
68
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
05
0*
**
0.
01
2*
*
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
01
8*
**
0.
01
6*
0.
04
8*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
05
8*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
03
0
0.
07
9
-0
.0
46
0.
04
5
-0
.0
60
0.
04
8
0.
32
1
-0
.3
18
-0
.3
15
*
-0
.0
63
-0
.1
20
**
*
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.4
07
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.2
08
)
(0
.6
28
)
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.0
27
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
03
3*
**
0.
01
4*
0.
01
9*
**
0.
01
4*
*
0.
02
8*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
01
2*
*
0.
01
5
0.
03
2*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
04
5*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
06
1*
**
0.
00
9
0.
02
4*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
01
4
0.
05
7*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
06
4*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
0.
03
9
0.
21
7
-0
.0
19
0.
01
3
-0
.0
50
0.
05
2
0.
36
4
-0
.3
45
-0
.2
62
-0
.0
43
-0
.1
18
**
*
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.4
35
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.2
24
)
(0
.7
04
)
(0
.1
95
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.0
28
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.8
28
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.3
76
)
(0
.4
81
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.1
95
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
90
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
11
4,
57
5
20
,7
94
26
2,
81
4
46
,5
04
11
6,
48
1
12
,3
05
37
,7
37
8,
60
4
9,
91
3
63
,1
76
39
8,
17
1
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
29
0.
00
02
0.
00
08
0.
00
09
0.
00
14
0.
00
27
0.
00
05
0.
00
03
0.
00
27
0.
00
12
0.
00
38
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
19
7.
2
4.
2
20
7.
5
41
.1
15
9.
7
33
.1
17
.8
2.
9
26
.9
75
.9
1,
52
9.
3
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n.
TORTAROLO |  61 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.7
: O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 1
99
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(A
LL
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
EC
U
SL
V
M
EX
N
IC
PA
N
PE
R
U
R
Y
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.1
09
**
*
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.1
05
**
*
-0
.0
76
**
*
-0
.1
30
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.1
58
**
*
-0
.1
16
**
*
-0
.1
33
**
*
-0
.1
39
**
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.1
24
**
*
-0
.1
45
**
*
-0
.1
74
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
03
2*
**
0.
01
4*
**
0.
03
7*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
01
6*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
01
8*
**
0.
04
5*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
05
2*
**
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
69
**
*
0.
36
4
-0
.0
33
0.
07
2
0.
06
0
0.
19
4
0.
10
2
-0
.0
42
0.
18
1
0.
17
6
0.
05
2
0.
07
0
-0
.1
49
-0
.1
45
**
*
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.4
65
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.1
43
)
(0
.3
67
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.3
10
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.3
11
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.0
30
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
01
9*
**
0.
01
0
0.
02
7*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
01
3*
0.
01
9*
**
0.
02
0*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
00
8
0.
02
3*
**
0.
04
8*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
04
1*
**
0.
01
7*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
01
5*
0.
03
3*
**
0.
01
1
0.
03
7*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
04
2*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
04
9*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
72
**
*
0.
43
3
0.
00
1
0.
05
7
0.
08
1
0.
24
2
0.
10
4
-0
.0
26
0.
13
6
0.
16
9
0.
05
5
0.
24
7
-0
.1
53
-0
.1
51
**
*
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.5
17
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.4
25
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.3
40
)
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.0
32
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.7
10
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.4
73
)
(0
.5
92
)
(0
.8
27
)
(0
.3
72
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.9
86
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
18
3,
87
4
27
,9
50
43
3,
69
6
63
,3
07
15
5,
38
6
48
,8
47
24
,1
70
41
7,
89
6
25
,1
65
11
,7
37
10
3,
09
2
10
,4
41
90
,1
01
48
2,
54
8
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
12
0.
00
02
0.
00
16
0.
00
13
0.
00
10
0.
00
10
0.
00
03
0.
00
11
0.
00
05
0.
00
24
0.
00
08
0.
00
11
0.
00
09
0.
00
31
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
17
2.
7
6.
2
54
9.
7
80
.1
16
2.
1
47
.3
7.
4
43
8.
6
12
.2
28
.5
78
.8
11
.4
58
.8
1,
17
8.
6
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 62  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Ta
bl
e 
A
.8
: O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 1
99
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(M
A
R
R
IE
D
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
EC
U
SL
V
M
EX
N
IC
PA
N
PE
R
U
R
Y
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
92
**
*
-0
.0
58
**
*
-0
.0
86
**
*
-0
.0
58
**
*
-0
.1
09
**
*
-0
.0
93
**
*
-0
.1
40
**
*
-0
.0
91
**
*
-0
.1
21
**
*
-0
.1
32
**
*
-0
.0
88
**
*
-0
.1
26
**
*
-0
.1
26
**
*
-0
.1
66
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
03
3*
**
0.
01
5*
**
0.
03
9*
**
0.
03
9*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
04
8*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
06
0*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
08
**
*
0.
18
5
-0
.0
59
-0
.0
01
0.
07
4
0.
32
8*
*
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
58
*
0.
07
6
0.
11
0
-0
.0
20
0.
15
4
-0
.0
03
-0
.1
57
**
*
(0
.0
77
)
(0
.4
28
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.2
18
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.2
63
)
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.0
29
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
01
9*
**
0.
00
9
0.
02
9*
**
0.
03
7*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
01
5*
0.
02
0*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
04
7*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
00
9
0.
02
7*
**
0.
05
5*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
04
2*
**
0.
01
9*
**
0.
04
4*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
01
5*
0.
04
3*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
04
4*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
05
8*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
15
**
*
0.
23
4
-0
.0
29
-0
.0
12
0.
08
8
0.
40
2*
**
-0
.0
42
-0
.0
41
0.
04
8
0.
10
8
-0
.0
21
0.
24
5
0.
03
8
-0
.1
64
**
*
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.4
54
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.1
67
)
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.2
86
)
(0
.1
84
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.0
31
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.6
44
)
(0
.8
81
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.9
18
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.5
41
)
(0
.6
41
)
(0
.7
17
)
(0
.6
76
)
(0
.0
75
)
(0
.4
87
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
16
8,
99
0
26
,0
35
38
7,
63
9
56
,7
71
13
4,
89
0
44
,7
20
20
,5
13
39
4,
75
0
20
,5
10
9,
95
4
94
,9
11
9,
26
0
75
,6
31
38
0,
95
1
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
13
0.
00
03
0.
00
18
0.
00
17
0.
00
13
0.
00
10
0.
00
09
0.
00
12
0.
00
07
0.
00
28
0.
00
09
0.
00
13
0.
00
11
0.
00
41
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
16
7.
2
6.
6
56
5.
8
98
.6
18
1.
3
42
.8
17
.6
45
5.
3
14
.9
28
.0
90
.0
12
.0
61
.5
1,
26
6.
6
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n.
TORTAROLO |  63 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.9
. O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 2
00
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(A
LL
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
C
R
I
EC
U
SL
V
M
EX
N
IC
PA
N
PE
R
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.1
13
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.1
14
**
*
-0
.0
77
**
*
-0
.1
41
**
*
-0
.1
11
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.1
14
**
*
-0
.1
12
**
*
-0
.1
19
**
*
-0
.1
34
**
*
-0
.1
18
**
*
-0
.1
32
**
*
-0
.1
48
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
02
3*
**
0.
01
3*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
03
3*
**
0.
04
8*
**
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
88
0.
10
5
-0
.0
04
-0
.2
24
0.
03
9
-0
.0
96
-0
.0
58
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
92
*
-0
.2
69
0.
30
0
0.
01
8
0.
08
1
-0
.0
61
*
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.4
35
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.2
58
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.2
38
)
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
36
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
01
3*
**
0.
00
7
0.
02
2*
**
0.
01
8*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
01
9*
**
0.
00
7
0.
02
1*
**
0.
01
4*
0.
01
4
0.
01
6*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
04
0*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
02
7*
**
0.
01
7*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
03
9*
**
0.
02
7*
**
0.
03
9*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
04
6*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
69
-0
.1
02
0.
01
2
-0
.2
65
0.
04
6
-0
.1
18
0.
00
8
-0
.0
37
-0
.0
76
-0
.2
84
0.
33
1
0.
06
0
0.
08
8
-0
.0
56
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.4
55
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.1
69
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.2
07
)
(0
.1
69
)
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.2
70
)
(0
.2
93
)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
40
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.5
47
)
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.6
67
)
(0
.8
30
)
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.7
80
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.9
06
)
(0
.9
51
)
(0
.3
55
)
(0
.5
95
)
(0
.1
01
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
8,
75
0
34
,5
15
46
0,
87
0
52
,1
21
16
8,
17
0
19
,2
00
52
,0
43
27
,4
23
56
1,
31
5
27
,0
37
13
,0
43
10
7,
25
3
10
6,
08
8
42
5,
54
6
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
06
0.
00
02
0.
00
09
0.
00
08
0.
00
12
0.
00
12
0.
00
08
0.
00
06
0.
00
13
0.
00
07
0.
00
10
0.
00
08
0.
00
12
0.
00
26
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
85
.7
6.
2
36
3.
7
43
.0
63
.5
22
.5
39
.4
16
.2
40
7.
7
18
.3
13
.0
81
.0
13
1.
5
83
5.
0
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 64  |
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34 T
ab
le
 A
.1
0:
 O
LS
 a
nd
 2
SL
S 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f f
er
til
ity
 a
nd
 fe
m
al
e 
la
bo
r s
up
pl
y.
 2
00
0s
 c
en
su
s 
(M
A
R
R
IE
D
 W
O
M
EN
)
A
R
G
BO
L
BR
A
C
H
L
C
O
L
C
R
I
EC
U
SL
V
M
EX
N
IC
PA
N
PE
R
V
EN
U
SA
Pa
ne
l A
 - 
O
LS
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.0
96
**
*
-0
.0
94
**
*
-0
.1
08
**
*
-0
.0
62
**
*
-0
.1
25
**
*
-0
.0
87
**
*
-0
.0
84
**
*
-0
.1
06
**
*
-0
.0
90
**
*
-0
.1
10
**
*
-0
.1
23
**
*
-0
.1
01
**
*
-0
.1
20
**
*
-0
.1
54
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
Pa
ne
l B
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
bl
es
(1
)
Sa
m
e-
se
x
0.
03
2*
**
0.
01
7*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
03
8*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
4*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
03
1*
**
0.
03
7*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
05
6*
**
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
23
**
-0
.0
26
0.
00
6
-0
.2
11
-0
.0
80
0.
02
4
-0
.0
25
0.
02
2
-0
.0
96
**
-0
.3
93
**
-0
.0
55
0.
01
6
0.
03
3
-0
.0
73
**
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.3
42
)
(0
.0
52
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.1
57
)
(0
.2
65
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
36
)
Pa
n
el
 C
 - 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
– 
ov
er
 id
en
ti
fi
ed
(1
)
Tw
o-
bo
ys
0.
02
5*
**
0.
00
9
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
2*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
03
8*
**
0.
01
9*
**
0.
01
0
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
02
5*
*
0.
01
9*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
04
6*
**
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(1
)
Tw
o-
gi
rl
s
0.
03
5*
**
0.
02
1*
**
0.
03
2*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
03
9*
**
0.
02
6*
**
0.
02
5*
**
0.
02
8*
**
0.
04
2*
**
0.
03
5*
**
0.
04
3*
**
0.
03
4*
**
0.
03
0*
**
0.
05
6*
**
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(2
)
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n
-0
.2
19
**
-0
.1
03
0.
02
0
-0
.2
33
-0
.1
13
0.
00
9
0.
03
9
0.
01
6
-0
.0
82
*
-0
.4
12
*
-0
.0
45
0.
04
1
0.
04
1
-0
.0
68
*
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.3
60
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.1
42
)
(0
.1
88
)
(0
.1
74
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.2
27
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
39
)
Sa
rg
an
 p
-v
al
ue
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.4
77
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.9
89
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.7
73
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.7
93
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.9
14
)
(0
.7
34
)
(0
.6
20
)
(0
.7
43
)
(0
.1
78
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
82
,2
46
31
,2
07
40
0,
60
5
44
,0
28
13
9,
06
3
16
,4
22
46
,5
27
21
,6
36
51
7,
59
5
22
,3
15
11
,1
57
96
,1
17
88
,1
79
31
2,
21
0
(3
)
Pa
rc
ia
l-R
2
0.
00
13
0.
00
03
0.
00
11
0.
00
10
0.
00
15
0.
00
13
0.
00
08
0.
00
07
0.
00
15
0.
00
12
0.
00
16
0.
00
09
0.
00
14
0.
00
35
(4
)
F-
st
at
is
tic
10
3.
4
9.
7
37
1.
5
43
.9
63
.6
22
.1
35
.1
14
.5
43
0.
3
26
.4
17
.5
90
.8
12
1.
9
84
3.
5
N
ot
e:
 R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. O
th
er
 c
ov
ar
ia
te
s 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
s 
ar
e 
A
ge
, A
ge
 a
t 
fir
st
 b
ir
th
, p
lu
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
x 
of
 th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 s
ec
on
d 
ch
ild
re
n.
 S
am
pl
es
 a
s 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
 a
nd
 th
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
. A
ll 
m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
w
ei
gh
ts
 (s
ee
 
ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
.3
). 
(1
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t s
ta
ge
 u
si
ng
 M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
as
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (2
) C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
st
ag
e 
us
in
g 
W
or
ke
d 
fo
r 
pa
y 
as
 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e;
 (3
) G
oo
dn
es
s 
of
 t 
be
tw
ee
n 
M
or
e 
th
an
 2
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
an
d 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 fo
r 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
co
va
ri
at
es
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
; (
4)
 F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
 o
n 
Sa
m
e-
se
x 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
ta
ge
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n.
TORTAROLO |  65 
Ta
bl
e 
A
.1
1:
 D
if
fe
re
nc
es
 in
 m
ea
ns
 fo
r d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 b
y 
Sa
m
e-
se
x.
 2
00
0 
C
en
su
s
A
rg
Bo
l
Br
a
C
hl
C
ol
C
ri
Ec
u
Sl
v
M
ex
N
ic
Pa
n
Pe
r
U
ry
V
en
U
SA
A
ge
-0
.0
79
**
*
-0
.0
44
0.
03
1*
**
-0
.0
57
*
0.
01
2
-0
.0
23
0.
02
1
0.
02
0
0.
01
2
0.
00
9
-0
.0
40
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
66
0.
01
5
0.
00
2
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
11
)
A
ge
 a
t fi
rs
t b
ir
th
0.
00
3
0.
02
9
0.
01
1
-0
.0
22
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
-0
.0
18
0.
04
0
0.
00
8
0.
04
2
-0
.0
34
0.
00
2
-0
.0
65
0.
03
6*
0.
00
2
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
11
)
O
w
ne
r
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
07
0.
00
2
0.
01
0*
**
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
 
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
-0
.0
04
0.
00
1
0.
00
5
-0
.0
03
0.
00
2
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
So
m
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
00
1
0.
00
9*
-0
.0
02
0.
00
2
-0
.0
03
0.
00
5
0.
00
1
-0
.0
07
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
-0
.0
02
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
So
m
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
12
**
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
01
0.
00
3
0.
00
0
-0
.0
05
0.
00
0
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
So
m
e 
te
rt
ia
ry
 e
du
ca
tio
n
0.
00
0
0.
00
4
0.
00
2*
*
-0
.0
04
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
0.
00
2
0.
00
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
13
8,
32
1
34
,4
36
45
9,
38
5
52
,0
09
16
7,
54
1
19
,1
37
51
,8
87
27
,3
02
55
9,
99
4
26
,9
44
13
,0
16
10
6,
98
2
10
,4
10
10
5,
69
0
42
3,
54
9
So
ur
ce
: o
w
n 
es
ti
m
at
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
IP
U
M
S-
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l. 
N
ot
e:
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 m
ea
ns
 (m
ea
n 
of
 S
am
e-
se
x 
m
ot
he
rs
 m
in
us
 m
ea
n 
of
 M
ix
ed
-s
ex
 m
ot
he
rs
) a
nd
 th
ei
r 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
ti
on
s 
(i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s)
. *
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
, *
* 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 5
%
, *
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
0%
. T
he
 s
am
pl
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 w
om
en
 a
ge
d 
21
-3
5 
w
it
h 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
ag
ed
 1
8 
or
 y
ou
ng
er
. T
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 fr
om
 U
ru
gu
ay
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 1
99
0 
ce
ns
us
. O
w
ne
r 
is
 =
 1
 if
 th
e 
m
ot
he
r 
ow
ns
 th
e 
ho
us
e 
w
he
re
 s
he
 li
ve
s;
 S
om
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
is 
= 
1 
if 
th
e m
ax
im
um
 ed
uc
at
io
n 
lev
el 
of
 th
e m
ot
he
r i
s l
es
s t
ha
n 
co
m
pl
et
e p
rim
ar
y;
 S
om
e s
ec
on
da
ry
 ed
uc
at
io
n 
= 
1 
fo
r c
om
pl
et
e p
rim
ar
y 
or
 
in
co
m
pl
et
e s
ec
on
da
ry
; S
om
e t
er
tia
ry
 ed
uc
at
io
n 
= 
1 
fo
r c
om
pl
et
e s
ec
on
da
ry
 o
r m
or
e.
